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The 2004 Constitution of Afghanistan vaguely describes the powers 
of the Supreme Court (the Court) to interpret the constitution and 
exercise judicial review. It also describes an independent commission for 
the supervision of the implementation of the constitution (the 
Commission), whose powers are ambiguous and seem to overlap with 
those of the Court. The political branches of the government have taken 
advantage of these constitutional ambiguities and adopted legislation that 
vested judicial review and constitutional interpretation powers in two 
rival institutions, the Court and the Commission, thereby containing the 
power of the regular judiciary. This Article explores the implications of 
this fragmented system of judicial review in Afghanistan. It argues that 
this fractured system of judicial review has severely undermined the 
powers of the Court, and it has impeded the ability of both the Court and 
the Commission to issue binding judicial review opinions. Both entities 
have instead developed a practice of advising the political branches of 
the government, and, in the process, they have issued a large number of 
advisory opinions, letting the executive and the legislature treat the Court 
and the Commission as consultative bodies rather than co-equal and 
independent branches of the government.  
This Article offers the first detailed examination of Afghanistan’s 
judicial review system. In addition, it adds a critical and timely case 
study to the scholarship on the politics of courts in authoritarian regimes. 
Specifically, this history and analysis provide evidence to support claims 
made by Tom Ginsburg and Tamir Moustafa that authoritarian presidents 
try to restrain the power and authority of the regular judiciary by setting 
up competing institutions with overlapping jurisdiction over 
constitutional matters instead of creating a unified hierarchical 
institutional mechanism. This Article further illustrates that Ginsburg and 
Moustafa’s theory might be extended to powerful, not necessarily 
authoritarian, executives who may also contain the power of the regular 
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judiciary by intentionally engineering competing institutions to resolve 
constitutional disputes. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
During the drafting of the 2004 Constitution of Afghanistan, the 
drafters extensively debated which institution, the Supreme Court (the 
Court) or a constitutional court, should exercise judicial review and 
interpret the constitution.1 At first, the makers of the 2004 Constitution 
proposed a separate and independent constitutional court with explicit 
powers to interpret the constitution and review the constitutionality of 
legislation.2 Later, however, the makers of the Constitution dropped the 
proposed constitutional court when former President Hamid Karzai 
(2002–2014) opposed it.3 The removal of the constitutional court raised a 
question over which institution had the power to issue binding 
constitutional interpretation and judicial review opinions.4 It was 
particularly confusing given other haphazard changes made in the draft, 
including Article 121, which empowered the Court to review the 
constitutionality of legislation, and Article 157, which required the 
establishment of the Independent Commission for the Supervision of the 
Constitution.5 As a result, neither the Commission nor the Court had 
clear authority to interpret the constitution and perform the various types 
of judicial review functions.6 Instead, both the Commission and the 
Court ostensibly share the authority to interpret the constitution and 
review the constitutionality of legislation.7 
  
 1. Shamshad Pasarlay, Constitutional Interpretation and Constitutional Review 
in Afghanistan: Is There Still a Crisis?, I-CONNECT (Mar. 18, 2015), 
http://www.iconnectblog.com/2015/03/constitutional-interpretation-and-constitutional-
review-in-afghanistan-is-there-still-a-crisis/ [hereinafter Constitutional Interpretation].  
 2. Id; see also JOHN DEMPSEY & J. ALEXANDER THIER, U.S. INST. OF PEACE, 
RESOLVING THE CRISIS OVER CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION IN AFGHANISTAN 1 
(2009), https://www.usip.org/publications/2009/03/resolving-crisis-over-constitutional-
interpretation-afghanistan. 
 3. See DEMPSEY & THIER, supra note 2, at 1–2. 
 4. Id at 2; see also Constitutional Interpretation, supra note 1. 
 5. QANUN-I ASSASI-YE JAMHURI-YE ISLAMI AFGHANISTAN [THE CONSTITUTION 
OF AFGHANISTAN] 1382 (Jan. 3, 2004), arts. 121, 157 (Afg.), 
http://moj.gov.af/Content/files/OfficialGazette/0801/OG_0818.pdf [hereinafter 2004 
CONSTITUTION OF AFGHANISTAN]. 
 6. See id. 
 7. See MOHAMMAD HASHIM KAMALI, AFG. RESEARCH & EVALUATION UNIT, 
AFGHANISTAN’S CONSTITUTION TEN YEARS ON: WHAT ARE THE ISSUES? 5–6 (2014); see 
also Constitutional Interpretation, supra note 1. 
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This article explores the implications of the fragmented system of 
judicial review and constitutional interpretation in Afghanistan. It argues 
that when formed, the Commission was highly controversial largely 
because its powers were unclear and appeared to overlap with the powers 
of the Court, a body that, for the first time in Afghanistan’s history, had 
been given the right to exercise judicial review.8 Over time, however, the 
Commission seems to have acquired significant interpretive and review 
authority through a practice of advising coupled with executive and 
legislative respect – or at least a lack of disrespect – for its opinions. 
Nevertheless, the Commission’s practice of issuing advisory judicial 
review opinions in Afghanistan undermines the authorities of the regular 
judiciary because both the Court and the Commission can interpret the 
constitution and perform different types of judicial review functions. 
This fractured judicial review system further impeded the ability of the 
Court and the Commission to issue binding judicial review opinions. 
Both entities have instead developed a practice of advising the political 
branches of government, and, in the process, they have issued a large 
number of advisory opinions, letting the executive and the legislature 
treat the Court and the Commission as consultative bodies rather than co-
equal and independent branches of the government.9 
The rest of this Article is structured as follows. Part II provides a 
history of the debates about which institution should issue binding 
judicial review opinions during the 2002–2004 constitution-making 
process. It also describes how the political branches – the executive and 
the legislature – ended up structuring the current system of judicial 
review and constitutional interpretation. Part III charts how a crisis over 
constitutional interpretation emerged in the aftermath of then Foreign 
Minister Rangin Dadfar Spanta’s case in 2007 and how the crisis 
intensified during the contested 2010 parliamentary elections. Part IV 
explores the powers of the Court and the Commission when it comes to 
issuing judicial review and constitutional interpretation opinions, 
revealing that both the Court and the Commission appear to share the 
power to interpret the constitution, review the constitutionality of 
legislation, and offer legal advice to the political branches of the 
government. Part V explores the broader lessons we might draw from the 
  
 8. Constitutional Interpretation, supra note 1. 
 9. See KAMALI, supra note 7, at 5. 
250 Michigan State International Law Review [Vol. 26.2 
fragmented system of judicial review in Afghanistan. Finally, part VI 
highlights that the competitiveness between the Court and the 
Commission to exercise judicial review and interpret the constitution 
might trigger a political crisis any time a dispute emerges between the 
political branches of the government, especially in highly politicized 
environments; part VI also addresses that constitutional designers should 
avoid setting up such institutional mechanisms. The appendices at the 
end of this Article provide translations of two important Court decisions 
that create an understanding regarding the Court’s constitutional 
interpretation and judicial review powers. 
II. THE 2002–2004 CONSTITUTION-MAKING PROCESS: QUESTIONS OF 
JUDICIAL REVIEW AND CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION 
Following the removal of the Taliban regime in October 2001, the 
United Nations (UN) assembled in Bonn, Germany, leading Afghan 
elites to discuss plans for a future government in Afghanistan.10 The 
meeting in Germany resulted in the signing of the Agreement on 
Provisional Arrangements in Afghanistan Pending the Re-Establishment 
of Permanent Government Institutions, otherwise known as the Bonn 
Agreement (the Agreement).11 The Agreement arranged for a timetable 
for a two-year transitional period.12 More specifically, the Agreement set 
an interim government followed by a transitional administration.13 The 
transitional administration was responsible for the drafting of a new 
constitution.14 The process for the making of the 2004 Constitution began 
in October 2002, when the then-president of the transitional government, 
  
 10. CHRIS JOHNSON ET AL., OVERSEAS DEV. INST., AFGHANISTAN’S POLITICAL AND 
CONSTITUTIONAL DEVELOPMENT 3 (2003), https://www.odi.org/sites/odi.org.uk/files/odi-
assets/publications-opinion-files/5888.pdf; see generally ZALMAY KHALILZAD, THE 
ENVOY: FROM KABUL TO THE WHITE HOUSE, MY JOURNEY THROUGH A TURBULENT 
WORLD (2016); see also JAMES F. DOBBINS, AFTER THE TALIBAN: NATION-BUILDING IN 
AFGHANISTAN (2008). 
 11. J. Alexander Thier, The Making of a Constitution in Afghanistan, 51 N.Y.L. 
SCH. L. REV. 557, 566 (2006) [hereinafter The Making of a Constitution]. 
 12. Agreement on Provisional Arrangements in Afghanistan Pending the Re-
Establishment of Permanent Government Institutions, U.N. DOC. S/2001/1154, at 3 (Dec. 
5, 2001), http://www.refworld.org/docid/3f48f4754.html (art. I(4)).  
 13. Id. at 3 (arts. I(1), I(4)). 
 14. Id. (art. I(6)). 
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Karzai, appointed the Constitutional Drafting Commission (CDC).15 The 
process ended in January 2004, when Karzai signed and promulgated the 
new Constitution of Afghanistan.16 
Afghanistan has a rich and long (although mostly failed) 
constitutional history, but the country does not have a long history of 
judicial review. From 1923, when Afghanistan adopted its first written 
constitution, up to 2004, Afghanistan has experienced nine different 
constitutions (including the two draft constitutions prepared by the Sunni 
and Shi’ite mujahidin parties in 1993).17 Except for the 1977 
Constitution, which authorized the Supreme Court to interpret the 
constitution,18 none of the Afghan constitutions adopted judicial review 
or authorized the judiciary to interpret the constitution. While 
Afghanistan’s 1987 Constitution created a French style constitutional 
council, that council only provided legal advice to the president of the 
state and performed a priori review of legislation, which also came in the 
form of legal advice to the president.19 The Council did not have the 
power to interpret the constitution or perform a posteriori review of 
legislation.20  
  
 15. The Making of a Constitution, supra note 11, at 566; see generally Barnett R. 
Rubin, Crafting a Constitution for Afghanistan, 15 J. DEMOCRACY 5 (2004). 
 16. Rubin, supra note 15, at 5; see also The Making of a Constitution, supra note 
11. 
 17. See generally Amin Tarzi, Islam and Constitutionalism in Afghanistan, 5 J. 
PERSINATE STUD. 205, 210–41 (2012) (detailing the constitutional history of Afghanistan); 
see also Mohammad Hasan Kākaṛ, Constitutional History of Afghanistan, ENCYCLOPEDIA 
IRANICA (Dec. 15, 1992), http://www.iranicaonline.org/articles/constitutional-history-of-
afghanistan; see also Saïd Amir Arjomand, Constitutional Developments in Afghanistan: 
A Comparative and Historical Perspective, 53 DRAKE L. REV. 943 (2005); see also 
NIGHAT MEHROZE CHISHTI, CONSTITUTIONAL DEVELOPMENT IN AFGHANISTAN (1998). 
 18. QANUN-I ASSASI-YE DAWLAT-I JAMHURI-YE AFGHANISTAN [CONSTITUTION OF 
THE REPUBLICAN STATE OF AFGHANISTAN] 1355 (1976), art. 135 (Afg.), 
http://moj.gov.af/Content/files/OfficialGazette/0301/OG_0360.pdf [hereinafter 1976 
CONSTITUTION OF AFGHANISTAN] (this is cited as the 1977 Constitution based on the 
Lunar year 1355; however, based on the Gregorian Calendar, this Constitution came into 
being in 1976). 
 19. QANUN-I ASSASI-YE JAMHURI-YE AFGHANISTAN [THE CONSTITUTION OF 
AFGHANISTAN 1987] 1366 (1987), arts. 122–127 (Afg.), 
http://moj.gov.af/Content/files/OfficialGazette/0601/OG_0660.pdf [hereinafter 1987 
CONSTITUTION OF AFGHANISTAN]. 
 20. See id.  
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One of the key contested questions during the drafting of the 2004 
Constitution was which entity – a separate constitutional court or the 
Court – to give the power to issue binding judicial review opinions.21 The 
drafting of the 2004 Constitution proceeded in five stages: stage I 
included the creation and work of the CDC, which prepared a first draft 
of the constitution.22 Stage II included the formation and the work of the 
Constitutional Review Commission (the CRC), which examined the draft 
prepared by the CDC.23 In stage III, the government formed another, 
smaller committee comprised of the members of the CRC and members 
from the cabinet of the transitional administration, which revised the 
draft of the constitution prepared by the CRC.24 In stage IV, the 
government convened the Constitutional Loya Jirga (the CLJ), 
Afghanistan’s constitutional convention, which adopted the 
constitution.25 Finally, stage V involved the promulgation of the 
constitution by Karzai in January 2004. 
Initially, the CDC and the CRC both proposed a separate and 
independent constitutional court that had the power to review the 
constitutionality of legislation and interpret the constitution.26 The 
Commission appeared in the 2004 Constitution at stage IV of the 
constitution-making process – during the debates at the CLJ.27 Related to 
the changes in stage IV, the CLJ added Article 157 on the establishment 
of the Commission in the draft just hours before it adopted the 
constitution.28   
  
 21. Constitutional Interpretation, supra note 1. 
 22. See The Making of a Constitution, supra note 11, at 566. 
 23. Id. 
 24. Id. 
 25. Id. 
 26. QANUN-I ASSASI-YE JAMHURI-YE ISLAMI AFGHANISTAN [THE CONSTITUTION 
OF AFGHANISTAN] 1382 (Mar. 2003), arts. 142–50 (Afg.) (draft prepared by the 
Constitutional Drafting Commission) (on file with author) [hereinafter DRAFT 
CONSTITUTION PREPARED BY THE CONSTITUTIONAL DRAFTING COMMISSION]; QANUN-I 
ASSASI-YE JAMHURI-YE ISLAMI AFGHANISTAN [THE CONSTITUTION OF AFGHANISTAN] 
1382 (Nov. 2003), arts. 141–47 (Afg.) (draft prepared by the Constitutional Review 
Commission) (on file with author) [hereinafter DRAFT CONSTITUTION PREPARED BY THE 
CONSTITUTIONAL REVIEW COMMISSION]. 
 27. KAMALI, supra note 7, at 13–14; see also Constitutional Interpretation, supra 
note 1.  
 28. QANUN-I ASSASI-YE JAMHURI-YE ISLAMI AFGHANISTAN [THE CONSTITUTION 
OF AFGHANISTAN] 1382 (Jan. 4, 2004), art. 157 (Afg.) (draft adopted by the 
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A. The Proposed Constitutional Court: Why Did the Government 
Remove It From the Draft? 
The first draft of the 2004 Constitution prepared by the CDC included 
provisions defining a strong constitutional court.29 The CDC members 
unanimously agreed to include a separate institution, the constitutional 
court, to interpret the constitution, conduct judicial review, and police 
constitutional compliance.30 The CDC indicated that the inclusion of a 
separate constitutional court was necessary because, under previous 
Afghan constitutions, the political branches of the government 
consistently disregarded constitutional limits on their power.31 There 
were no strong institutions that could oversee the implementation of 
constitutions.32 Only a separate and powerful constitutional court could 
effectively serve the purpose of supervising the implementation of the 
constitution, interpreting the constitution, and performing all forms of 
constitutional review functions.33 In the drafters’ view, a constitutional 
court would also help prevent executive excesses of power and constrain 
that power.34 
Some members of the CDC emphasized that the world was moving 
toward constitutional courts and that almost all new democracies had 
successfully opted for separate constitutional courts to police 
constitutional compliance, resolve political disputes, and review the 
constitutionality of legislation.35 Therefore, the CDC chose and included 
a separate constitutional court in the draft it prepared.36 This view 
  
Constitutional Loya Jirga) (on file with author) [hereinafter DRAFT CONSTITUTION 
ADOPTED BY THE CONSTITUTIONAL LOYA JIRGA]. 
 29. DRAFT CONSTITUTION PREPARED BY THE CONSTITUTIONAL DRAFTING 
COMMISSION, supra note 26, arts. 142–50. 
 30. SARWAR DANISH, HUQUQ-I ASSAS-I AFGHANISTAN [CONSTITUTIONAL LAW OF 
AFGHANISTAN] 290 (1389) [2010]. 
 31. Id.  
 32. Interview with Mohammad Amin Ahmady, Member, Constitutional Review 
Commission, in Kabul, Afg. (Apr. 9, 2015); Interview with Nematullah Shahrani, Chair, 
Constitutional Drafting and Constitutional Review Commissions, in Kabul, Afg. (Apr. 7, 
2015). 
 33. Interview with Mohammad Ashraf Rasooli, Member, Constitutional Drafting 
and Constitutional Review Commissions, in Kabul, Afg. (Mar. 25, 2015). 
 34. Id. 
 35. See DANISH, supra note 30, at 290. 
 36. Interview with Mohammad Ashraf Rasooli, supra note 33.  
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confirms a recent but growing body of literature on theories of 
transnational diffusion, the idea that judicial review is adopted in 
response to previous adoption by other emerging democracies.37 
In this first stage of the 2002–2004 constitution-making process, the 
CDC designed a considerably stronger constitutional court. The 
following provisions of the CDC draft are related to the supreme 
constitutional court: 
Draft Article 142. The Supreme Constitutional Court of the Islamic 
Republic of Afghanistan shall supervise and examine the conformity of 
laws with the constitution in accordance with the provisions of this 
Constitution. 
Draft Article 143. The Supreme Constitutional Court shall be 
comprised of nine members appointed by the president for a period of 
six years. The president shall appoint one member as the head of the 
Court. The members of the Court can be reappointed. The presidents of 
the country shall be permanent members of the Court after their terms 
of service. 
Draft Article 144. Members of the Supreme Constitutional Court shall 
have good character; higher legal and jurisprudential [fiqhi] education, 
ten-year experience in legislative, legal and judicial affairs, shall have 
completed forty years of age and shall not have been convicted for a 
crime and deprivation of civil rights. 
Draft Article 145. The Supreme Constitutional Court shall have the 
following authorities:  
1. Examine the conformity of laws, legislative decrees and 
international treaties with the Constitution; 
2. Interpret the constitution, laws and legislative decrees;  
3. Examine and resolve claims of fraud in the presidential elections;  
  
 37. See generally Tom Ginsburg & Mila Versteeg, Why Do Countries Adopt 
Constitutional Review?, 30 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 587, 588 (2013); see generally David S. 
Law & Mila Versteeg, The Evolution and Ideology of Global Constitutionalism, 99 CAL. 
L. REV. 1163 (2011); see generally Rosalind Dixon & Eric A. Posner, The Limits of 
Constitutional Convergence, 11 CHI. J. INT’L L. 399 (2011).  
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4. Offer legal advice to the president; and 
5. Perform other functions bestowed on the Court by law. 
Draft Article 146. The president or the government shall refer 
legislative bills to the Supreme Constitutional Court to examine their 
compliance with the Constitution.  
Draft Article 147. In situations when a court, while adjudicating on a 
dispute, determines that the provision of a law on point in a dispute is 
in contradiction with the Constitution, the proceedings shall stop, and 
the issue shall be referred to the Supreme Constitutional Court. This 
provision shall also apply in cases when a party to the dispute claims 
such a contradiction and the court approves it. 
Draft Article 148. The decisions of the Supreme Constitutional Court 
shall be final without review. Its decisions shall be published in the 
Official Gazette.  
Draft Article 149. The property of the president, vice-president, prime 
minister, members of the government and justices of the Supreme 
Court shall be examined by the Supreme Constitutional Court before 
and after their terms of office. 
Draft Article 150. Law shall regulate the structure and procedure of the 
Supreme Constitutional Court.38 
Ultimately, this CDC draft was submitted to the CRC for review and 
to the CLJ for approval. The CRC members also agreed to include an 
independent constitutional court in the constitution.39 Debates on the 
constitutional court in the CRC centered around the number of judges at 
the constitutional court, the authorities of the constitutional court, and 
whether it should only be empowered to interpret the constitution, review 
the constitutionality of legislation, and offer legal advice to the president 
  
 38. DRAFT CONSTITUTION PREPARED BY THE CONSTITUTIONAL DRAFTING 
COMMISSION, supra note 26, arts. 142–50. 
 39. See generally ASHRAF RASOOLI, MOROR-I BAR QAWANEEN-I ASSASI-YE 
AFGHANISTAN [AN OVERVIEW OF THE CONSTITUTIONS OF AFGHANISTAN] (2nd ed. 1392 
[2013]) [hereinafter AN OVERVIEW OF THE CONSTITUTIONS OF AFGHANISTAN]. 
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or if it should also be authorized to examine executive actions for 
constitutional compliance.40 
Under the CDC draft, the constitutional court had the power to 
interpret the constitution, review the constitutionality of legislation, 
adjudicate on electoral disputes, and offer legal advice to the president.41 
The CRC believed that the constitutional court would be overburdened if 
it performed all of these functions.42 Most argued that the constitutional 
court should only be empowered to review the constitutionality of 
legislation and interpret the constitution, laws, and international 
treaties.43 Although the CRC did not explicitly list the review of 
executive actions for constitutional compliance as the authority of the 
constitutional court, it believed that constitutional review included the 
scrutiny of all executive and legislative actions for constitutional 
compliance.44 
Furthermore, the CRC rejected the proposal that the constitutional 
court should offer legal advice to the political branches of the 
government.45 The CRC feared that the political branches of the 
government could misuse such advisory opinions and that issuing 
advisory opinions could also seriously undermine the independence and 
institutional security of the constitutional court and negatively affect the 
binding nature of its decisions.46 In the end, the CRC members 
unanimously agreed to remove the constitutional court’s power to issue 
advisory opinions from the CDC draft.47 The final version of the 
constitutional court in the CRC draft that went to the government for 
approval looked like the following: 
  
 40. Deb. on Design of the Constitutional Court (2002–2004) (Afg.) (on file with 
author).  
 41. DRAFT CONSTITUTION PREPARED BY THE CONSTITUTIONAL DRAFTING 
COMMISSION, supra note 26, art. 145.  
 42. Deb. on Design of the Constitutional Court, supra note 40. 
 43. Id. 
 44. Id. 
 45. Id. 
 46. Id. (remarks of Ashraf Rasooli and Abdul Hai Elahi).   
 47. DRAFT CONSTITUTION PREPARED BY THE CONSTITUTIONAL REVIEW 
COMMISSION, supra note 26, ch. 8. 
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Draft Article 141. The Supreme Constitutional Court of the Islamic 
Republic of Afghanistan shall supervise the conformity of laws with 
the Constitution. 
Draft Article 142. The Supreme Constitutional Court shall be 
comprised of six members appointed by the president for a non-
renewable period of nine years subject to the approval of the Upper 
House (Mishrano Jirga) of the National Assembly. The president shall 
appoint one member as the president of the Supreme Constitutional 
Court. Law shall regulate the structure and procedure of the Supreme 
Constitutional Court. 
Draft Article 143. Members of the Supreme Constitutional Court shall 
be Afghan nationals not having other nationalities, shall have higher 
legal and jurisprudential [fiqhi] education, ten-year experience in 
legislative, legal and judicial affairs, shall have completed 40 years of 
age and shall not have been convicted for a crime and deprivation of 
civil rights. 
Draft Article 144. The Supreme Constitutional Court shall have the 
following authorities:  
1. Examine the conformity of laws, legislative decrees and 
international treaties with the Constitution; and 
2. Interpret the Constitution, laws and legislative decrees. 
Draft Article 145. The president, the government or one-fifth of the 
members of each house of the National Assembly can refer legislative 
bills to the Supreme Constitutional Court for a review of their 
compliance with the Constitution.  
Draft Article 146. In situations when a court, while adjudicating a 
dispute, determines that the provisions of a law on point in a dispute is 
in contradiction with the Constitution, the proceedings shall stop, and 
the issue shall be referred to the Supreme Constitutional Court. This 
provision shall also apply in cases when a party to the dispute claims 
such a contradiction and the court approves it. The Independent Human 
Rights Commission can also refer laws to the Supreme Constitutional 
Court if it finds that a provision of a law violated the constitutional 
rights of the citizens. 
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Draft Article 147. Legislative documents that are declared 
unconstitutional by the Supreme Constitutional Court shall be 
considered ineffective. The decision of the Supreme Constitutional 
Court shall be final without review. Its decisions shall go into effect 
after publication in the Official Gazette.48  
Although some powers of the constitutional court, such as 
adjudicating on electoral disputes, were dropped, the constitutional court 
appeared unsatisfactory to the executive.49 The executive feared that the 
constitutional court would become something like the Iranian Council of 
Guardians50 that would use constitutional provisions, specifically those 
dealing with Islam and the sharia, to undermine the political system.51 
Similarly, the then Iranian President Mohammad Khatami advised 
Karzai against the inclusion of the constitutional court in the Afghan 
Constitution, citing Iran’s struggle with the Council of Guardians.52 
However, a CRC member indicated that the CRC “had not designed the 
constitutional court carefully.”53 The constitutional court, as designed by 
the CRC, was a mixture of the American, French, and German models of 
constitutional court and constitutional review that turned out to be 
problematic in Afghanistan – a country which had never experienced 
constitutional review.54 As such, the CRC was unable to defend the 
constitutional court, and the drafters opted to remove it from the CRC 
draft before the draft was submitted to the CLJ for approval.55 
  
 48. Id. arts. 141–47. 
 49. See generally DEMPSEY & THIER, supra note 2. 
 50. The Iranian Council of Guardians has the responsibility under the Iranian 
Constitution to make sure laws passed by the legislature do not contradict the constitution 
and the standards of Islam. Council of Guardians: Iranian Government, ENCYLOPAEDIA 
BRITANNICA, https://www.britannica.com/topic/Council-of-Guardians (last visited Nov. 
25, 2017). 
 51. See Constitutional Interpretation, supra note 1. 
 52. Interview with Mohammad Amin Ahmady, supra note 32; Interview with 
Mohammad Sediq Patman, Member, Constitutional Review Commission, in Kabul, Afg. 
(July 7, 2015).  
 53. Interview with Mohammad Alam Eshaqzai, Member, Constitutional Review 
Commission, in Nangarhar, Afg. (June 9, 2015); Interview with Mohammad Amin 
Ahmady, supra note 32. 
 54. Interview with Mohammad Amin Ahmady, supra note 32. 
 55. Id. 
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Karzai and his allies’ opposition to the proposed constitutional court 
apparently related to Karzai’s desire to limit checks on the executive 
power as much as possible. Similarly, by removing the constitutional 
court from the draft constitution, Karzai and his allies removed a venue 
where their opponents could challenge governmental conduct for 
constitutional compliance.  
B. The CLJ Debates: The Haphazard Inclusion of Article 157 in 
the Constitution 
After the executive removed the constitutional court from the CRC 
draft, it released the draft to the public, and the CLJ was convened to 
approve the new constitution.56 The powers of the constitutional court to 
exercise judicial review and interpret the constitution came within the 
authorities of the Court in draft Article 121, while the constitutional 
court’s power to police constitutional compliance was given to the 
president of the state.57 Article 121 of the draft constitution revised by the 
executive and submitted to the CLJ, which did not have a constitutional 
court, read as follows: “At the request of the government or courts, the 
Supreme Court shall review the compliance of laws, legislative decrees 
and international treaties with the constitution. The Supreme Court shall 
have the authority to interpret laws, legislative decrees, international 
treaties and the constitution.”58 
This draft came to the CLJ for approval. The CLJ continued to debate 
whether to include a separate constitutional court that could police 
constitutional compliance, review the constitutionality of legislation, and 
interpret the constitution.59 The majority of the delegates at the CLJ 
wanted to reintroduce a constitutional court as existed in the CRC draft.60 
Delegates at the CLJ protested against the provision of the draft that gave 
  
 56. Arjomand, supra note 17, at 955. 
 57. QANUN-I ASSASI-YE JAMHURI-YE ISLAMI AFGHANISTAN [THE CONSTITUTION 
OF AFGHANISTAN] 1382 (Dec. 2003), art. 121 (Afg.) (draft revised by the Executive) (on 
file with author) [hereinafter DRAFT CONSTITUTION REVISED BY THE EXECUTIVE].  
 58. Id. (emphasis added). 
 59. Rubin, supra note 15, at 15. 
 60. Interview with Abdul Rab Rasool Sayyaf, Chairman, Second Working 
Committee, Member, Constitutional Loya Jirga, in Kabul, Afg. (Mar. 26, 2015); DANISH, 
supra note 30, at 307. 
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the president the power to police constitutional compliance.61 Delegates 
at the CLJ complained that there will be no institution to judge 
constitutional compliance if the president disregarded the constitution.62 
Being the sole judge of constitutional compliance, the president would 
misuse this power.63 
At the CLJ debates, almost all of the ten working groups proposed a 
separate constitutional court.64 The draft that the CLJ Reconciliation 
Committee finalized included a separate constitutional court in Article 64 
with the power to review the constitutionality of legislation.65 
Nevertheless, the version of the draft that came to the general meetings 
of the CLJ did not have the proposed constitutional court.66 The 
proponents of the constitutional court stated that the Supreme Court, as it 
was then all comprised of mullahs (those versed in sharia law only) or 
clerics, who were not trained in public law or in constitutional law, 
should not be the institution to interpret the constitution.67 They 
complained that such a Court would compromise fundamental rights, 
especially the rights of women and minorities, by using vague sharia law 
provisions, such as Article 3 of the Constitution.68  
Karzai and his supporters continued to argue against the inclusion of 
the constitutional court in the draft on the same grounds as they had done 
  
 61. Interview with Khalil Ahmad Khinjani, Member, Constitutional Loya Jirga, 
in Kabul, Afg. (May 18, 2015). 
 62. Id. 
 63. Interview with Abdul Shokor Waqif Hakimi, Member, Constitutional Loya 
Jirga, in Kabul, Afg. (Aug. 9, 2015). 
 64. The Making of a Constitution, supra note 11, at 567. The Constitutional Loya 
Jirga that adopted the 2004 Constitution was divided into ten different working groups to 
review the draft constitution. IRIN, Afghanistan: Progress Being Made at Loya Jirga, 
RELEIF WEB (Dec. 23, 2003), https://reliefweb.int/report/afghanistan/afghanistan-
progress-being-made-loya-jirga. The Loya Jirga also had a Reconciliation Committee 
that reconciled the views of these working groups. Id. 
 65. See ASIF MOHSINI, TASWEEB-I QANUN ASSASI DAR LOYA JIRGA-YE JADI [THE 
ADOPTION OF THE CONSTITUTION IN THE LOYA JIRGA OF DECEMBER] 1382 [2010]; see also 
AN OVERVIEW OF THE CONSTITUTIONS OF AFGHANISTAN, supra note 39, at 179. 
 66. AN OVERVIEW OF THE CONSTITUTIONS OF AFGHANISTAN, supra note 39, at 
179. 
 67. See generally INT’L CRISIS GRP., AFGHANISTAN: THE CONSTITUTIONAL LOYA 
JIRGA 8–9 (2003) (explaining Islam’s influence on the legislative process of Afghanistan 
and the notable political power held by mullahs); see also Rubin, supra note 15, at 15.  
 68. Interview with Mohammad Ashraf Rasooli, supra note 33.  
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during the CRC debates.69 The opponents of the constitutional court 
succeeded to convince the chairman of the CLJ not to include a 
constitutional court in the constitution.70 When the rest of the members of 
the CLJ were informed, there was chaos in the CLJ and discussions over 
a constitutional court went without any final resolution, ending in 
deadlock between the majority of the CLJ members and the supporters of 
Karzai.71 In the last hours of the CLJ debates, the final proposal shrunk to 
a commission that would oversee the implementation of the constitution, 
but the constitution did not clarify how this Commission was to be set 
and what powers it would enjoy.72 The CLJ approved version of this 
Commission in Article 157 looked like the following: “An Independent 
Commission for the Supervision of the Implementation of the 
Constitution should be established in accordance with the provisions of 
the law.”73  
This last-minute inclusion of the Commission into the CLJ draft 
resulted in confusion over which institution should exercise all forms of 
judicial review, offer legal advice to the political branches of the 
government, and interpret the constitution. The confusion arose primarily 
because of the ambiguities in articles 121 and 157, especially due to the 
changes that the CLJ brought to Article 121. Before the inclusion of 
Article 157 in the draft constitution, which created the Commission, 
Article 121 read: “At the request of the government, or courts, the 
Supreme Court shall review laws, legislative decrees, international 
treaties as well as international covenants for their compliance with the 
  
 69. Rubin, supra note 15, at 15. 
 70. Karzai’s allies argued the following: first, Afghanistan might not be able to 
satisfy the budget of a separate constitutional court. Second, in 2004, Afghanistan did not 
have constitutional law experts that might serve on the constitutional court. And third, the 
creation of a separate constitutional court might create clashes of jurisdiction with a 
Supreme Court that might weaken both of these two institutions. See Shamshad Pasarlay, 
Making the 2004 Constitution of Afghanistan: A History and Analysis Through the Lens 
of Coordination and Deferral Theory, ch. 4 (June 10, 2016) (unpublished Ph.D. 
dissertation, University of Washington) (on file with author) [hereinafter A History and 
Analysis Through the Lens of Coordination]. 
 71. See id. 
 72. DRAFT CONSTITUTION ADOPTED BY THE CONSTITUTIONAL LOYA JIRGA, supra 
note 28, art. 157. 
 73. Id. 
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constitution. The Supreme Court shall have the authority to interpret 
laws, legislative decrees and the constitution.”74 
This language in Article 121 changed after the CLJ inserted Article 
157 in the draft it finalized. Article 121, after the inclusion of Article 157 
in the draft that was finalized by the CLJ read as the following: “At the 
request of the government, or courts, the Supreme Court shall review 
laws, legislative decrees, international treaties as well as international 
covenants for their compliance with the constitution, and interpret them 
in accordance with the law.”75  
In this language, the Court is not explicitly authorized to interpret the 
constitution as it was in the earlier version of Article 121. Here, Article 
121 vaguely states “interpret them in accordance with the law,” making it 
difficult to understand whether the interpretation of the constitution is 
part of “interpret them in accordance with the law” or not.76 The matter 
was complicated because Article 157 did not make clear either whether 
the Commission is the body whose job is to interpret the constitution.77 
This textual vagueness would later become the crux of the crisis over 
which institution, the Court or the Commission, could review the 
constitutionality of laws, offer legal advice on constitutional questions, 
and interpret the constitution.78 
Different views emerged after Article 157 was included in the 
constitution. Sarwar Danish, a member of the CDC and CRC, maintained 
that when Article 157 came into the constitution, it did not affect the 
powers of the Court to interpret the constitution under Article 121.79 
Other CRC members maintained that the major disagreement in the CLJ 
was whether the Court would be the most effective institution to interpret 
the constitution and review the constitutionality of legislation.80 The 
majority of the delegates favored an institution other than the Court to 
  
 74. DRAFT CONSTITUTION REVISED BY THE EXECUTIVE, supra note 57, art. 121 
(emphasis added). 
 75. DRAFT CONSTITUTION ADOPTED BY THE CONSTITUTIONAL LOYA JIRGA, supra 
note 28, art. 121 (emphasis added). 
 76. Id. 
 77. Id. art. 157. 
 78. See DEMPSEY & THIER, supra note 2, at 4; see also Constitutional 
Interpretation, supra note 1. 
 79. DANISH, supra note 30, at 307. 
 80. See A History and Analysis Through the Lens of Coordination, supra note 
70, ch. 4. 
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interpret the constitution.81 When the Commission appeared in the draft, 
it was implicitly believed that it would have the power to interpret the 
constitution.82 Nevertheless, it remains contested to this day whether the 
Court or the Commission is the proper institution entrusted with the 
power to interpret the constitution and perform all types of judicial 
review functions.83 In fact, both bodies share the power to interpret the 
constitution, review the constitutionality of legislation, and offer legal 
advice to the political branches of the government on constitutional 
issues.84 
III. CASES LEADING TO THE EMERGENCE OF A CRISIS OVER 
CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION AND THE CREATION OF THE 
COMMISSION 
The CLJ adopted the 2004 Constitution, despite its textual vagueness 
on the issue of constitutional interpretation and who should perform all 
types of judicial review functions.85 While the Afghan parliament did not 
pass a law on the jurisdiction and authorities of the Commission under 
Article 157 until late 2008, it unsuccessfully tried several times “to 
address the problem of judicial independence and constitutional 
jurisdiction of the . . . Court” and the Commission.86 Karzai stood in the 
way of any parliamentary attempts to create the Commission because the 
existing structure of judicial review protected the executive’s interests.87 
For example, under the constitution, only the president has the authority 
to appoint all the judges of lower courts without any parliamentary 
approval.88 Further, under Article 121, only the government and courts 
have standing to challenge the constitutionality of legislation before the 
Court.89 Article 121 does not authorize members of the parliament, 
  
 81. Id.  
 82. Interview with Abdul Rab Rasool Sayyaf, supra note 60. 
 83. Constitutional Interpretation, supra note 1. 
 84. Id. 
 85. See DEMPSEY & THIER, supra note 2, at 3. 
 86. INT’L CRISIS GRP., REFORMING AFGHANISTAN’S BROKEN JUDICIARY 16 
(2010), https://www.crisisgroup.org/asia/south-asia/afghanistan/reforming-afghanistan-s-
broken-judiciary [hereinafter REFORMING AFGHANISTAN’S BROKEN JUDICIARY]. 
 87. Id. 
 88. 2004 CONSTITUTION OF AFGHANISTAN, supra note 5, art. 132. 
 89. Id. art. 121. 
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political parties, or other institutions to initiate judicial review 
proceedings before the Court.90 Establishing the Commission would thus 
provide a venue for Karzai’s opponents to challenge his actions for 
constitutional compliance. 
During this time, the Court assumed the power to interpret the 
constitution, provide legal advice, and perform all types of judicial 
review functions.91 From 2005 to 2007, the Court issued a number of 
decisions and tried to establish jurisdiction over political disputes 
between the legislature and the executive.92 For example, in 2005, when 
the Afghan government failed to hold district council elections, a 
question emerged over how to appropriately constitute the Mishrano 
Jirga (the Afghan parliament’s upper house) because district councils are 
supposed to form one-third of its members.93 Karzai asked the Court to 
rule on how to form the upper house.94 The Court ruled that, “in the 
absence of district council elections, the one-third of the membership of 
the upper house of Parliament left vacant by local elections could still be 
formed with two-thirds of its members chosen by Provincial Councils.”95 
Under normal circumstances, provincial councils introduce one member 
  
 90. Rainer Grote, Separation of Powers in the New Afghan Constitution, 64 
HEIDELBERG J. INT’L L. 897, 911 (2004). 
 91. See SCOTT WORDEN & SYLVANA Q. SINHA, CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION 
AND THE CONTINUING CRISIS IN AFGHANISTAN (Nov. 7, 2011), 
https://www.usip.org/publications/2011/11/constitutional-interpretation-and-continuing-
crisis-afghanistan; see also KAMALI, supra note 7, at 11; see generally Mohammad Qasim 
Hashimzai, The Separation of Powers and the Problem of Constitutional Interpretation in 
Afghanistan, in CONSTITUTIONALISM IN ISLAMIC COUNTRIES: BETWEEN UPHEAVAL AND 
CONTINUITY 665 (Rainer Grote & Tilmann J. Röder eds., 2012). 
 92. See generally Hashimzai, supra note 91 (a number of these Supreme Court 
decisions are discussed). 
 93. Article 140 of the Constitution states that “[c]ouncils shall be established to 
organize activities … [and] attain active participation of the people in provincial 
administrations in districts and in villages…. Local residents shall elect members of these 
councils for [three] years through free, general, secret . . . [and] direct elections.” 2004 
CONSTITUTION OF AFGHANISTAN, supra note 5, art 140. 
 94. KAMALI, supra note 7, at 10. 
 95. WORDEN & SINHA, supra note 91, at 2. 
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to the upper house of the parliament.96 This decision was accepted and 
the upper house was formed accordingly.97 
Similarly, in 2006, a dispute emerged between the parliament and the 
executive over the meaning of the word “akthariyyat” (majority) in 
parliamentary votes to approve governmental ministers, Supreme Court 
justices, and other high-ranking state officials whose appointment 
required the approval of the parliament.98 The specific question was 
whether the term “majority votes” to approve these officials meant the 
majority votes of all members of the parliament or the majority votes of 
the members present in a single parliamentary session.99 Again, Karzai 
asked the Court to rule on this question.100 The Court held that 
akthariyyat, in parliamentary votes to approve officials whose 
appointment require parliamentary approval, means the majority votes of 
the members present in a session not the majority votes of all members 
of the parliament.101 
Parliament apparently accepted these decisions, and they seemed to 
indicate that the Court possessed final authority to interpret the 
constitution, exercise judicial review, and provide legal advice to the 
executive.102 However, this implicit understanding was challenged in 
May 2007, when the Court invalidated the parliament’s decision to 
remove then Foreign Minister Spanta from his ministerial post.103 
Minister Spanta’s case, for the first time, intensified the question of 
which body, the Court or the Commission, should interpret the 
constitution and perform all types of judicial review functions.104 This 
case also inflamed the parliamentary debate over the formation of the 
Commission and the clarification of its mandate.105 Moreover, the 
  
 96. See National Assembly, PAJWOK AFG. NEWS, 
http://www.elections.pajhwok.com/en/content/national-assembly (last visited Nov. 25, 
2017). 
 97. WORDEN & SINHA, supra note 91, at 2. 
 98. KAMALI, supra note 7, at 11 n.38. 
 99. Id. 
 100. Id. 
 101. Id.; see generally Hashimzai, supra note 91. 
 102. WORDEN & SINHA, supra note 91, at 2.  
 103. See Carlotta Gall, Afghan Legislators Vote Out Foreign Minister, N.Y. TIMES 
(May 13, 2007), http://www.nytimes.com/2007/05/13/world/asia/13kabul.html. 
 104. DEMPSEY & THIER, supra note 2, at 3. 
 105. See id. at 4; see also KAMALI, supra note 7, at 10–15. 
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contested parliamentary elections of 2010 further deepened the crisis 
over who should interpret the constitution, offer legal advice to the 
political branches of the government, and perform all types of judicial 
review functions.106 
In both cases, citing textual vagueness in the 2004 Constitution, the 
parliament opposed the Court’s power to interpret the constitution or 
resolve political disputes between the legislature and the executive.107 
The Court became involved in both of these cases due to Karzai.108 On 
both occasions, the Court decided in favor of the president.109 
Nevertheless, the decisions of the Court in both cases created severe 
political backlashes that undermined the Court’s independence, 
threatened its institutional security, and dramatically limited its authority 
to interpret the constitution and perform all types of judicial review 
functions.110  
A. Foreign Minister Spanta’s Case: Parliament’s Removal Powers 
and its Judicial Scrutiny  
In April 2007, the Iranian government began to forcefully deport 
Afghan refugees.111 In May 2007, using its authority under Article 92 of 
the Constitution,112 the Afghan parliament impeached Mohammad Akbar 
  
 106. See Shamshad Pasarlay, When Courts Decide Not to Decide: Understanding 
the Afghan Supreme Court’s Struggle to Decide the Fate of the Dismissed Ministers, I-
CONNECT (Mar. 22, 2017), http://www.iconnectblog.com/2017/03/when-courts-decide-
not-to-decide-understanding-the-afghan-supreme-courts-struggle-to-decide-the-fate-of-
the-dismissed-ministers/ [hereinafter When Courts Decide Not to Decide]. 
 107. Id. 
 108. Constitutional Interpretation, supra note 1. 
 109. WORDEN & SINHA, supra note 91, at 2; see also DEMPSEY & THIER, supra 
note 2, at 3. 
 110. When Courts Decide Not to Decide, supra note 106. 
 111. Iran Deports Thousands of Illegal Afghan Workers, IRIN (Apr. 30, 2007), 
http://www.irinnews.org/report/71865/afghanistan-iran-iran-deports-thousands-illegal-
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 112. Article 92 of the Constitution states that the parliament, “on the proposal of 
twenty percent of all its members” can summon governmental ministers. 2004 
CONSTITUTION OF AFGHANISTAN, supra note 5, art. 92. If the explanations given are not 
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Akbar, then Minister for Refugees and Repatriation, and Rangin Dadfur 
Spanta, then Minister for Foreign Affairs, questioning both about the 
mass deportation of Afghan refugees.113 During the impeachment 
proceedings, the two Ministers’ explanations did not apparently convince 
or satisfy the parliament.114 As a result, the Ministers became the subject 
of no-confidence votes.115 Minister Akbar lost by eleven votes.116 
However, the vote against Minister Spanta was problematic because it 
was not decisive.117 When the votes were counted, the no-confidence 
vote came just one short of the required quorum to dismiss a minister.118 
Two mismarked votes were also found, which caused confusion about 
the correct and proper vote result.119 Two days later, in May 2007, the 
parliament decided to cast a second no-confidence vote against Minister 
Spanta.120 At the second voting, the parliament succeeded in stripping 
Minister Spanta of his ministerial post.121  
This second voting begot confusion over its constitutionality, and 
Karzai refused to appoint the successor of Minister Spanta.122 As the 
parliament insisted on a replacement for Minister Spanta, Karzai asked 
the Court to rule both on the constitutionality of the parliament’s original 
action – impeachment – against Minister Spanta and the legality of the 
second voting.123 The parliament reacted strongly to the President’s 
referral, claiming that the Court had no jurisdiction over this matter.124 
The parliament argued that while Article 121 of the Constitution 
authorized the Court to review the constitutionality of parliamentary 
legislation, it did not empower the Court to rule on the constitutionality 
  
 113. KAMALI, supra note 7, at 10. 
 114. Id. 
 115. Id. 
 116. Afghan Parliament Votes to Sack Refugees Minister, THE NEWS 
INTERNATIONAL (May 11, 2007), https://www.thenews.com.pk/archive/print/650180.   
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 120. Id; see also DEMPSEY & THIER, supra note 2, at 3.  
 121. Gall, supra note 103; see also KAMALI, supra note 7, at 10.  
 122. See DEMPSEY & THIER, supra note 2, at 3. 
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of the parliament’s appointment or removal powers.125 Therefore, the 
parliament made it clear that it would not accept the Court’s decision in 
this respect. 
Despite the parliament’s objections, the Court decided to rule on the 
constitutionality of the parliament’s decision to remove Minister Spanta. 
The Court ruled that while the parliament did have an implied 
constitutional right to remove a minister under Article 92 of the 
Constitution,126 the vote against Minister Spanta was unconstitutional for 
two main reasons.127 First, the Court found that the reason for which 
Minister Spanta became the subject of the no-confidence vote – the mass 
deportation of Afghan refugees from Iran – was not something within the 
rational control of the Foreign Minister.128 The Court stated that a 
parliamentary vote of no-confidence should be based on valid and 
convincing reasons.129 The Court emphasized that the reasons should 
underlie the fault of a minister on the “commission or omission of a 
responsibility.”130 The basis of a no-confidence vote, according to the 
Court, cannot be the commission or omission of an action related to the 
subjects that a minister does not have control over.131 The Court then 
examined a number of Foreign Ministry documents related to its 
communication with the Iranian government on the issue of Afghan 
refugees and found that the Foreign Minister had taken all the necessary 
steps to prevent the deportation of Afghans.132 However, preventing the 
Iranian government from its decision to deport Afghan refugees was not 
within the authority or the responsibility of the Foreign Minister.133 The 
  
 125. DEMPSEY & THIER, supra note 2, at 3; see also 2004 CONSTITUTION OF 
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Court thus ruled that the basis of the no-confidence vote was not valid or 
convincing as required by Article 92 of the Constitution.134  
Second, referring to the second round of voting, the Court ruled that 
the parliament did not follow appropriate procedures in voting Minister 
Spanta out of office.135 The Court specifically referred to Article 65 of 
the parliament’s rules of procedures,136 which states that after the result 
of a no-confidence vote is announced, “another debate cannot be held 
over an approved subject.”137 The Court thus held that opening a new 
debate on the same question, the impeachment of Minister Spanta, was 
illegal under the parliament’s internal rules of procedure.138 In addition, 
the Court stated that the participation of new members who were 
unaware of the reason for Minister Spanta’s impeachment during the 
second vote made the impeachment and subsequent removal of the 
Minister illegal.139  
The parliament rejected the Court ruling, stating that the Court did not 
have jurisdiction to resolve this dispute.140 As a result, confusion arose 
over which institution could hear and resolve such disputes.141 In 
response to this crisis, the executive, Karzai, and the Court “each 
proposed legislation that would resolve [these] jurisdictional 
questions.”142 The Court proposed an amendment to the Law on the 
Organization and Jurisdiction of the Courts (2005) that attempted to 
clarify the Court’s jurisdiction allowing it to adjudicate on such cases.143 
The Court’s proposal attempted to amend Article 24 of the Law on the 
Organization and Jurisdiction of the Courts to explicitly authorize the 
Court to interpret the constitution and to resolve other disputes resulting 
from the application of law and the exercise of legal authority between 
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the legislature and the executive.144 The parliament, however, rejected the 
Court’s proposal, stating that under Article 121, the Court did not have 
the power to interpret the constitution or resolve political disputes 
between the legislature and the executive.145 
At the same time, the executive drafted a law on the Commission 
under Article 157 of the Constitution.146 This law would have allowed the 
Commission to perform a priori review of governmental bills before the 
parliament’s approval.147 The executive’s proposed legislation also 
empowered the Commission to provide legal advice on questions 
emerging from the constitution and to review the laws of previous 
governments for their compliance with the constitution, advising the 
president in this respect, who would then take the necessary action.148 
Nevertheless, the parliament amended the draft law of the Commission 
removing the explicit power to provide an advisory opinion on 
legislation before the approval of the president.149 Instead, the parliament 
included language that gave the Commission the power to interpret the 
constitution on the request of the president, the parliament, and the 
Court.150 Karzai, however, vetoed this legislation because he believed 
that the language in Article 8 of the law of the Commission, which 
empowered the Commission to interpret the constitution, violated articles 
121, 122, and 157 of the Constitution.151  
Karzai further argued that: (1) Article 121 of the Constitution 
authorized only the Court to interpret the constitution152 and (2) the 
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Constitution granted the Commission only the power to supervise the 
implementation of the constitution and not the power to interpret it.153 In 
September 2008, the parliament overrode Karzai’s veto of the law of the 
Commission by a two-thirds majority, making it enforceable 
legislation.154 Karzai then referred the Commission’s law to the Court for 
review of its constitutionality.155 The Court promptly ruled in the 
executive’s favor, invalidating those provisions of the law that authorized 
the Commission to interpret the constitution.156 “In June 2009, Karzai 
submitted the [Court’s] ruling against the establishment of the 
[C]omission” for publication in the Official Gazette.157 The parliament 
yet again refused to accept the opinion of the Court on the 
unconstitutionality of the law of the Commission, claiming that the Court 
faced “a conflict of interest in making its decisions” without providing 
further details.158 
Finally, the parliament pushed ahead with the approval of candidates 
appointed by Karzai for membership in the Commission.159 During the 
June 2010 confirmation hearings before the parliament, Commission 
nominees acknowledged that they would exercise the Commission’s 
authority to interpret the constitution and provide legal advice, so long as 
the parliament supports the Commission.160 Upon its creation, and 
backed strongly by the parliament, the Commission undertook the task of 
interpreting the constitution despite opposition from the executive and 
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the Court.161 The status of the Commission’s opinion, however, remains 
unclear. 
B. The 2010 Contested Parliamentary Elections: The 
Constitutional Interpretation Crisis Deepens 
In September 2010, the Afghan government held its second 
parliamentary elections after the adoption of the 2004 Constitution.162 
The government held the 2010 parliamentary elections shortly after the 
2009 contested presidential elections in which claims of fraud and 
electoral engineering had severely undermined the institutional viability 
and independence of the Independent Electoral Commission (IEC).163 
Although the IEC took all necessary measures and employed reforms to 
prevent fraud, its performance was seriously challenged.164 Two main 
concerns were security and flaws in Afghanistan’s electoral system – 
both the laws and institutions.165 These flaws were highlighted when the 
IEC announced the long-delayed preliminary results of the parliamentary 
elections, which were promptly rejected by Karzai and his 
administration.166  
The IEC later announced the final certified results of the 2010 
parliamentary elections, and the international community approved 
them.167 However, the government and a number of defeated candidates 
still rejected the final certified results.168 The defeated candidates began 
to hold protest meetings around the country demanding that (1) the IEC 
and the government should declare the September 2010 parliamentary 
elections illegitimate, (2) the government should hold new parliamentary 
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elections using computerized national ID cards, and (3) the government 
should prosecute all individuals involved in electoral crimes.169 The IEC 
refused to declare the election illegitimate and made it clear that the 
results of the election were irreversible and that the IEC is the only entity 
allowed to investigate electoral complaints.170 
Unsatisfied with the final results of the elections, Karzai moved to 
appoint a special court to investigate complaints related to the elections 
“with [a] specific focus on identifying criminal offenses.”171 
Afghanistan’s 2004 Constitution and electoral laws “do not provide for 
the establishment of a special court to review election results.”172 This 
power is vested in the IEC.173 The question of the constitutionality of the 
Special Election Court (SEC) thus caused consternation. The SEC 
claimed it had the power to invalidate election results, call for recounts, 
and order re-runs of elections in specified provinces.174 The SEC argued 
that the Court had the power to authorize the establishment of a special 
court on the recommendation of the president of the country.175 
Nevertheless, the sitting parliament and the Commission both argued that 
the SEC is unconstitutional because only the IEC has the power to 
resolve electoral disputes.176  
Karzai then asked the Court to rule on the constitutionality of the 
SEC. The Court ruled that the establishment of the SEC to investigate 
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electoral complaints was consistent with the constitution.177 The Court 
stated that the president of the state has the power to establish a special 
court and submit a particular dispute to that special court.178 The Court’s 
decision angered the winning candidates to the parliament who refused to 
accept the opinion of the Court, arguing that the Court’s jurisdiction was 
limited to the review of the constitutionality of legislation under Article 
121 of the Constitution and did not extend to reviewing election 
complaints.179  
Even though the SEC had not finished its investigation, Karzai 
inaugurated the new parliament.180 In its first move, the newly 
inaugurated parliament declared the SEC an illegal body.181 Despite the 
parliament’s opposition, the SEC declared its findings, disqualifying 
sixty-two winning candidates and nominating their replacements.182 The 
parliament, however, did not accept the SEC’s decision and refused to 
bring any changes to the electoral results.183 In an effort to reduce a 
possible constitutional crisis, Karzai dissolved the SEC and ordered that 
the IEC should examine the allegations of fraud.184 In late August 2011, 
given severe political pressure, the IEC declared that only nine sitting 
members should be disqualified and replaced.185 
In the end, each body, the Court and the Commission, issued a 
different opinion on the constitutionality of the SEC.186 In fact, the Court, 
much to the anger of the new parliament, aligned itself with Karzai, 
while the Commission sided with the parliament and the electoral bodies 
in adjudicating that the creation of the SEC did not fall within the 
framework of the constitution and was thus unconstitutional.187 From this 
decision on, the parliament has always backed the Commission to 
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interpret the constitution and offer legal advice on constitutional 
questions while rejecting the Court’s power to do so.  
IV. SEVEN YEARS SINCE THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THE COMMISSION: 
WHAT THE COURT AND THE COMMISSION DO?  
Constitutional ambiguities surrounding the authorities of the Court 
and the Commission led to the creation of two competing institutions 
with overlapping powers to interpret the constitution and review the 
constitutionality of legislation. After the Commission was established, 
the legislature has always supported the Commission to interpret the 
constitution, perform a priori review of governmental bills, and offer 
legal advice to the parliament.188 The executive, however, continued to 
treat the Court as the only institution entrusted by the constitution with 
the power to interpret the constitution and review the constitutionality of 
legislation.189 As a result of this dual institutional mechanism, there were 
severe political crises every time a dispute emerged between the 
legislature and the executive over the results of elections and/or the 
appointment or removal of senior government officials.190 
Today, seven years after the establishment of the Commission, it 
seems that the crisis over which institution should interpret the 
constitution, offer legal advice, and review the constitutionality of 
legislation has subsided.191 A political “consensus, though implicit, has 
emerged” – one that has vested the two institutions with different kinds 
of constitutional review power.192 More importantly, the Court “no 
longer seems to challenge the authority of the . . . Commission to 
interpret the Constitution.”193 Likewise, while the executive was the first 
to challenge the authority of the Commission to interpret the constitution, 
it no longer does so.194 Soon after the creation of the Commission in 
2010, the executive also began requesting the Commission’s advisory 
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opinions on constitutional questions.195 Furthermore, responding to a 
request by the Commission for constitutional review of draft legislation, 
President Karzai issued a Presidential Decree in 2010 that authorized the 
Commission to perform a priori review of governmental bills before the 
approval of the parliament.196 This meant that such abstract review of 
legislation would be performed by the Commission, not the Court, which 
has the power to perform judicial review under the constitution. 
Strongly held views are thus apparently abandoned because this 
overlapping system of constitutional interpretation and judicial review 
serves the interests of both the legislature and the executive, as neither 
the Court nor the Commission has been successful to issue judicial 
review opinions that could bind the executive or the legislature.197 
Rather, both of these institutions have been treated as consultative 
agents, providing legal advice to the political branches of the 
government.198 
As a result, it seems that a political practice has emerged, showing 
that a pattern of acceptance has surfaced. This practice has not only 
calmed “the crisis over constitutional interpretation, but has also 
clarified, to some extent, the role of the Commission” and the Court 
when it comes to constitutional interpretation and judicial review 
practices.199 In other words, the Commission has reached an interesting 
modus vivendi with the Court, which has been ratified by the governing 
elites of Afghanistan, who appear to use the two institutions for different 
functions.200 There appear to be distinctions, however, between the 
Commission and the Court regarding their roles in judicial review and 
constitutional interpretation, and the following sections attempt to 
explain these differences. 
A. Constitutional Adjudication Powers of the Commission  
The work of the Commission thus far reveals that the Commission 
performs three functions as part of its authority to supervise the 
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implementation of the constitution. All of these functions take place in 
the form of legal advice and advisory opinions to the political branches 
of the government.201 Furthermore, the Commission is legally required to 
publish an annual report on the implementation of the constitution to the 
president of the state.202 However, this has not taken place so far.203 
First, the Commission interprets the constitution, and as such, offers 
interpretive opinions to the parliament, the president, the government, 
and the Court.204 Although the Court has not yet requested an opinion, on 
one occasion, the Commission has issued an advisory opinion addressed 
to the Court on the establishment of a special court to adjudicate on the 
corruption scandal of Kabul Bank.205 The Commission exercises its 
authority to interpret the constitution under Article 8(1) of its law, which 
states that the Commission can interpret the constitution upon the request 
of the parliament, the Court, and the executive.206 Although the Court 
determined Article 8(1) of the law of the Commission as 
unconstitutional, the parliament continues to request the Commission for 
constitutional interpretation opinions.207 
During the early days of the Commission’s functioning, only the 
parliament could request the Commission for constitutional 
interpretation; later, however, the executive also began to refer 
constitutional interpretation requests to the Commission when the 
executive’s interests allowed it.208 For example, the Commission, upon 
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the request of Karzai, issued an advisory opinion on the delays of the 
2014 presidential election.209 In its opinion, the Commission justified this 
delay of the election for technical reasons.210 Similarly, the Commission 
interpreted Article 7 of the Constitution, upon the request of the Ministry 
of Justice, on the status of international treaties in domestic courts,211 
stating that international treaties only become effective in Afghanistan 
when the parliament approves and implements them through enacting 
and implementing legislation.212 The main reason for the executive’s shift 
in practice was that the fragmented system of constitutional 
interpretation allowed the executive to submit simultaneous requests to 
both the Court and the Commission as a “means of hedging bets in case 
one institution offer[ed] a more favorable opinion.”213 
Second, the Commission seems to be consolidating its own role; it 
regularly conducts pre-promulgation abstract reviews of legislation – 
reviewing laws before they go into effect.214 The Commission apparently 
ends up performing this review in the form of legal advice in accordance 
with a 2010 Presidential Decree.215 Both the legislature and the executive 
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have made such requests to the Commission.216 For instance, in July 
2012, the Minister of the Government on Parliamentary Affairs requested 
the Commission to review the constitutionality of the draft law on 
combating administrative corruption.217 Similarly, in September 2012, 
the IEC requested the Commission to review the constitutionality of the 
proposed law of elections; the Commission issued an opinion stating that 
some of the law’s provisions did not comply with the constitution.218 The 
parliament sends most of these requests to the Commission.219 
Third, the Commission offers legal advice to the president and the 
parliament on issues arising from the implementation of the constitution. 
Notably, Article 8(3) of the law of the Commission states that the 
Commission has the duty to offer legal advice to the president and the 
parliament.220 In fact, “offering legal advice to the president and the 
[parliament] comprises a major part of the workload of the 
[Commission].”221 The parliament “has been an active participant in this 
respect, with more references to the Commission than the president or his 
cabinet for legal advice on constitutional matters.”222 With these three 
types of functions, it appears that the Commission almost acts as the 
proposed constitutional court would have done under the earlier drafts of 
the Constitution, except that the Commission’s decisions are not binding. 
In short, after its controversial inclusion in the Constitution during the 
2002–2004 constitutional negotiations, it appears that the Commission 
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has become a real institution with some capacity, which was beyond 
what the drafters of the constitution would have predicted. The 
Commission seems to have acquired a significant interpretive and review 
authority through a practice of advising the political branches coupled 
with executive and legislative respect or at least a lack of disrespect for 
its advisory opinions. 
B. Constitutional Adjudication Powers of the Supreme Court  
Somewhat distinct from the Commission, the Court seems to exercise 
two types of judicial review functions: concrete review of laws and post-
promulgation abstract review of laws.223 The Court’s practice shows that 
its judicial review power includes exercising these two types of 
review.224 Although there is no evidence to indicate that the Court has 
exercised a concrete judicial review of legislation, it has actively 
exercised post-promulgation abstract reviews of parliamentary 
legislation.225 For instance, on the request of the Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs, in September 2014, the Court issued an opinion reviewing the 
constitutionality of the law of Diplomatic and Consular Staff of 
Afghanistan that the parliament previously passed.226 The Court 
invalidated some provisions of this law.227  
Although Article 121 is vague on whether the Court can interpret the 
constitution, implicitly it implies constitutional interpretation power for 
the Court. Under Article 121, the Court interprets the constitution, as it 
often does while reviewing the constitutionality of legislation.228 
“However, since the establishment of the [Commission], the [Court] has 
hardly ever issued an interpretive opinion.”229 But this does not mean that 
the Court has been completely stripped of its power to interpret the 
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constitution. In fact, Karzai played a “strategic role and sent questions on 
constitutional matters to both institutions depending on which best 
secured his interests.”230 For example, Karzai referred to both the 
Commission and the Court to find a way that could legitimize the 
establishment of the SEC.231 When the Commission declared the SEC 
unconstitutional, Karzai turned to the Court to justify the creation of the 
SEC.232 
While the power of the Commission to interpret the constitution 
remains uncontested, at least for now, the parliament strongly objects to 
the power of the Court to interpret the constitution or resolve political 
disputes.233 For example, in November 2016, the parliament voted to 
remove seven key ministers from their ministerial posts.234 The executive 
asked the Court to interpret Article 92 of the Constitution to determine 
the limits of the parliament’s removal powers.235 The parliament, 
however, strongly objected to the executive’s referral, arguing that the 
Court did not have the power to interpret the constitution.236 No branch 
apparently contests the power of the Court to exercise judicial review, 
including both post-promulgation abstract review of laws and concrete 
judicial review. 
However, it should be noted that with the formation of the National 
Unity Government under the leadership of President Ashraf Ghani in 
2014, it appears that governmental practice has shifted.237 President 
Ghani apparently treats the Court as the proper body to interpret the 
constitution.238 For instance, since its formation in September 2014, the 
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National Unity Government has only made two constitutional 
interpretation requests, and it has submitted both to the Court, not to the 
Commission.239 At the same time, President Ghani requests the 
Commission, not the Court, for advisory opinions on constitutional 
questions,240 meaning that the fragmented system of judicial review and 
constitutional interpretation continues under this new administration. 
C. Can the Current Modus Vivendi Survive the Proposed 
Constitutional Reform under the National Unity Government 
Agreement?  
The flawed election system in Afghanistan to elect the presidents and 
resolve electoral disputes recently led to a political crisis that almost led 
to a civil war..241 A US-brokered power-sharing agreement between the 
two leading candidates, Ashraf Ghani and Abdullah Abdullah, resolved 
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the immediate election crisis.242 The National Unity Government 
Agreement (NUGA) between Ghani and Abdullah provided that Ghani 
would be recognized as president of Afghanistan and Abdullah would be 
recognized as its chief executive – a position not envisioned in the 2004 
Constitution.243 The NUGA provided that the president would cooperate 
with the chief executive to appoint ministers and Court justices to set 
policies.244 Together, they would also appoint a commission to draft 
amendments to the 2004 Constitution; the president would then convene 
a Loya Jirga, Afghanistan’s constitutional amendment convention,245 
which is empowered under the Constitution to debate, approve, or 
modify constitutional amendments.246 
Thus, one interesting question is whether the current fragmented 
system of constitutional interpretation and judicial review can survive the 
prospect of a significant set of constitutional amendments under the 
NUGA. Although there is broader political support for the creation of a 
separate constitutional court that would interpret the constitution and 
perform all types of constitutional review functions, political realities and 
the conduct of the National Unity Government thus far suggests that it is 
likely that the current system of judicial review will survive the prospect 
of a significant set of constitutional amendments in Afghanistan. 
Meanwhile, opting for a separate constitutional court seems challenging, 
as it requires extensive debates, compromise, and consensus.  
More importantly, the National Unity Government completed its 
three-and-a-half years in February 2018, but it has yet to finalize plans to 
reform its electoral system and appoint a commission to draft 
amendments to the constitution.247 At the time of this writing, it appears 
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unlikely that a constitutional amendment Loya Jirga will be convened to 
debate and adopt amendments to the constitution, thus creating a separate 
constitutional court with the power to interpret the constitution and 
review the constitutionality of legislation.  
Finally, the National Unity Government seems to be following 
Karzai’s trick – using the two institutions to accomplish different things. 
For instance, on the question of whether it would be constitutional for the 
parliament to continue after its term ended in June 2015 with no elections 
held, President Ghani referred to the Court, which issued a secret 
opinion.248 By contrast, President Ghani asked the Commission for legal 
advice when the parliament rejected an executive decree on reforming 
the Afghan electoral system.249 For all of these reasons, it seems that the 
current fragmented system of constitutional interpretation and judicial 
review might endure into the indefinite future. 
V. LESSONS FROM THE FRAGMENTED SYSTEM OF CONSTITUTIONAL 
INTERPRETATION AND JUDICIAL REVIEW IN AFGHANISTAN 
The drafters of the 2004 Constitution of Afghanistan, for the first time 
in Afghan history, equipped the Supreme Court to exercise judicial 
review, causing the drafters to expect that the Court will play a key role 
in safeguarding the constitution and interpreting its vague provisions.250 
However, constitutional ambiguities surrounding judicial review and 
constitutional interpretation created serious obstacles for the Court to 
effectively exercise its powers as the guardian of the constitution.251 The 
political branches of the government manipulated these constitutional 
ambiguities and vested two rival institutions with judicial review and 
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constitutional interpretation powers, which severely undermined the 
powers of both the Court and the Commission to issue binding 
opinions.252 
The experience of Afghanistan with judicial review thus offers a very 
significant lesson for the drafters of constitutions. Specifically, by 
leaving the laws of constitutional review bodies vague and undecided, a 
dangerous situation is created. Constitutional ambiguities surrounding 
the powers of judicial review bodies, like constitutional courts, have the 
potential of undermining the powers of such institutions in the future. 
Such constitutional ambiguities may dangerously lead to the 
politicization of the relations between the legislature and the judiciary, 
thereby resulting in direct conflict between them, in which the 
institutional security and independence of the judiciary is at stake.253 
Afghanistan’s history of judicial review further indicates that 
downstream legislatures and executives might simply choose to strike at 
the independence and authority of apex courts using constitutional 
ambiguities that define the judiciary’s powers and organization.254 
Furthermore, the experience of Afghanistan with judicial review and 
constitutional interpretation shows the dangers of issuing advisory 
opinions. Issuing advisory opinions might potentially undermine the 
popular legitimacy and independence of apex courts. The Court and the 
Commission’s large number of advisory opinions have led the legislature 
and the executive to treat both the Commission and the Court as bodies 
that are subordinates to the political branches of the government.255 The 
political branches of the government have treated every judicial review 
and constitutional interpretation opinion as advisory rather than as a 
binding decision.256 As a result, both the Commission and the Court have 
struggled to establish themselves as independent and co-equal branches 
of government.257 
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Finally, the history explored in this Article should interest scholars 
who study the politics of courts in authoritarian regimes. This history 
adds a critical case study to the scholarship on the functions of courts in 
authoritarian governments. Tom Ginsburg and Tamir Moustafa argue 
that authoritarian rulers strike at the power of the judiciary by setting up 
fragmented judicial systems in place of unified judiciaries.258 They 
explain that “[i]n the ideal type of a unified judiciary, the regular court[s] 
. . . [have] jurisdiction over every legal dispute . . . .”259 However, in 
fragmented systems, one or more supplementary, and at times interim, 
courts tend to operate along the regular judiciary.260 In these special 
courts, “the executive retains tight controls through nontenured political 
appointments, heavily circumscribed due process rights, and retention of 
the ability to order retrials if it wishes.”261 Politically sensitive and 
charged cases, about which the executive really cares, are channeled into 
these special temporary courts, allowing rulers to eliminate and 
marginalize political threats as necessary.262 The existence of such 
auxiliary courts alongside the regular judiciary in turn undermines the 
regular judiciary’s powers to resolve all judicial cases. 
The example of the fragmented system of judicial review in 
Afghanistan illustrates how Ginsburg and Moustafa’s theory may extend 
to powerful, not necessarily authoritarian, executives who may also 
contain the power of the regular judiciary by deliberately setting up 
competing institutions to resolve constitutional disputes. In Afghanistan, 
we saw that setting up the Commission, whose power overlapped with 
the Court, limited the power of the Court to unilaterally perform judicial 
review and issue binding constitutional interpretation opinions. The 
structure has threatened to strip the Court of its constitutional 
interpretation power. Furthermore, the main reason why Karzai’s 
government settled on this practice seems to be that this structure 
increased the likelihood that at least one of the two institutions would 
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side with the regime, thus further diminishing the ability of courts to 
effectively serve as checks on the actions of the executive.  
VI. CONCLUSION  
Inspired by the successful experience of judicial review in emerging 
democracies, the makers of the 2004 Constitution of Afghanistan, for the 
first time in Afghan history, adopted judicial review.263 The makers of 
the 2004 Constitution anticipated that armed with the power of judicial 
review, the Court would play a crucial role in safeguarding the 
Constitution.264 However, Afghanistan’s judicial review experience thus 
far has not been a successful story, primarily because of the 
constitutional ambiguities surrounding the jurisdiction and organization 
of the Court. The political branches of the government took advantage of 
these constitutional ambiguities and adopted legislation that vested the 
power of judicial review and constitutional interpretation in two rival 
institutions.265 As a result, somehow unusual by comparative standards, 
there is no unified hierarchical judiciary empowered to interpret the 
constitution, review the constitutionality of legislation, and resolve other 
disputes that emerge from the implementation of law between the 
legislature and the executive.266 
One of the key – and negative – implications of this fragmented 
system of judicial review in Afghanistan is that it has limited the power 
of the regular judiciary to unilaterally exercise judicial review functions 
and interpret the constitution. Moreover, setting up competing 
institutions to resolve constitutional disputes has undermined the 
authority of both the Court and the Commission to issue binding judicial 
reviews and constitutional interpretation opinions. Instead, Afghanistan’s 
fragmented system of judicial review has allowed the executive to submit 
simultaneous requests to both the Court and the Commission in the hopes 
that at least one institution will offer a more favorable opinion.267  
The dual institutional mechanism to interpret the constitution and 
review the constitutionality of legislation in Afghanistan thus highlights 
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deep flaws relating to judicial review – flaws that generate costly 
political crises every time a dispute emerges between the legislature and 
the executive over election results or appointment and removal of senior 
government officials. “Having two legal institutions with overlapping 
mandates in a highly politicized environment is a recipe for instability 
and fundamentally undermines the rule of law.”268 As a result of this 
fractured institutional mechanism, the Court has avoided ruling on key 
constitutional disputes.269 In fact, many constitutional disputes between 
the legislature and the executive were ultimately resolved through 
politics rather than judicial intervention – a practice that has severely 
undermined the ability of the judiciary to function as an effective check 
on the political branches of the government and safeguard the 
constitution.  
The key lesson to draw from the fragmented system of judicial review 
in Afghanistan is that having two parallel institutions with overlapping 
powers to interpret the constitution and review the constitutionality of 
legislation undermines the powers of the regular judiciary. To avoid 
constitutional crises of the type seen in Afghanistan, it is important that 
constitution makers develop, adopt, and design within the constitution a 
unified judicial hierarchy to interpret the constitution and review the 
constitutionality of legislation. Otherwise, the independence and the 
institutional security of the regular judiciary might very well be at stake.
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VII. APPENDIX I: TRANSLATION OF THE OPINION OF THE SUPREME 
COURT ON THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF THE LAW OF THE 
INDEPENDENT COMMISSION FOR THE SUPERVISION OF THE 
IMPLEMENTATION OF THE CONSTITUTION 
The High Council of the Supreme Court has passed the following 
opinion about the authorization of the Independent Commission for the 
Supervision of the Implementation of the Constitution [the Commission] 
to interpret the Constitution. 
Article 8(1) of the Commission’s law, which declares the 
interpretation of the Constitution part of the Commission’s duty and 
authority, is, based on the following reasons, contrary to the explicit 
provisions of Article 121 of the Constitution. 
1.  The Drafting History of Article 121, and the Intent of the 
Constitutional Framers. 
Before discussing other reasons, understating the gradual drafting 
history of Article 121 will be studied in the different drafts of the 
Constitution. Article 121 did not originally exist in the Constitution 
because there was another chapter on a Supreme Constitutional Court in 
the draft constitution. Article 146 of draft constitution read as follows: 
Draft Article 146: The Supreme Constitutional Court of Afghanistan 
shall have the following authorities: (1) review laws, decrees, and 
international conventions for their conformity with the constitution and 
(2) interpret the constitution, laws, and legislative decrees. 
Draft Article 146 explicitly shows that the intent of the framers was 
not only the interpretation of the Constitution, but also compliance of the 
laws and decrees with the Constitution and the interpretation of these 
laws and decrees. In this period of drafting, the constitutional review 
stage, as stated above, Article 121, which is now included in the Judicial 
Chapter of the Constitution, did not exist in the Chapter on Judiciary. 
Nonetheless, the Chapter on Constitutional Court was removed from the 
draft of the Constitution. After the Chapter on the Constitutional Court 
was removed, all authorities codified in Articles 146, 147, and 148 were 
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included in just one article, which became Article 121 in subsequent 
drafts of the constitution. Draft Article 121 read as the following: 
Article 121: The Supreme Court upon the request of the government or 
courts shall review compliance with the constitution of laws, legislative 
decrees, international treaties, and international conventions. The 
Supreme Court has the authority to interpret the constitution, laws, and 
decrees. 
As is evident in this language, draft Article 121 encompasses all of 
the provisions previously integrated into articles 146 and 147. 
Accordingly, the authority to interpret the constitution, laws, and other 
decrees has been given to the Supreme Court. Furthermore, it has also 
been pointed out that, as the constitution needs to be interpreted, other 
laws and decrees also need interpretation. 
In another subsequent draft of the constitution, the Loya Jirga 
amended draft Article 121 as the following: 
Article 121: The Supreme Court upon request of the government or 
courts shall review compliance with the Constitution of laws, 
legislative decrees, international treaties, and international conventions, 
and interpret them, in accordance with the law. 
As we see in the wording of Article 121, repetition of similar words 
has been avoided, and by the usage of the object “them” not only the 
previous points about the necessity to interpret the constitution, laws, and 
other decrees has been emphasized but also the interpretation of 
international treaties and conventions has been signaled as essential. The 
usage of the phrase “interpret them” incorporates all that were integrated 
in the preceding draft Article 121 including the Constitution, laws, 
decrees, international treaties, and international conventions. 
Accordingly, it has been clarified that international treaties and 
conventions also need to be interpreted the same way as laws, decrees, 
and the Constitution needs interpretation. Furthermore, this wording of 
Article 121 takes place at the time when there is no signs of Article 157, 
which stipulates provisions about the Commission. 
Nonetheless, in the final discussions of the Loya Jirga, which took 
place behind the scenes, in a subsequent draft of the Constitution, the 
structure of the Commission was incorporated in Article 157 of the 
Constitution. However, the inclusion of Article 157 in the Constitution 
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did not affect Article 121. Indeed, Article 121 was maintained with the 
same force. The language of Article 157 reads, “The Independent 
Commission for the Supervision of the Constitution will be established 
by law.” This language clearly states that Article 157 does not bestow 
any authority in terms of empowering the Commission to interpret the 
Constitution, or international treaties and conventions because no such 
authorization has been included in the text of Article 157. As a result, the 
authority to interpret the Constitution, similar to the interpretation of 
other laws, decrees, and international treaties, has been effectively 
assigned to the Supreme Court.  
Moreover, there are other practical explanations that suggest that the 
Supreme Court is the only institution to interpret the Constitution: (1) the 
interpretation of the Constitution, other laws, and decrees requires the 
issuance of a judicial opinion, a “Qarar-e-Qazhai.” The issuance of a 
judicial opinion, having a binding character, is the sole authority of a 
court not of any other non-judicial organ, in this case the Commission; 
(2) the duties of the Commission are clear as it is the “Independent 
Commission for the Supervision of the Implementation of the 
Constitution”; meaning that the Commission is only mandated to oversee 
the implementation of the Constitution not to interpret the Constitution.” 
Any change in the text of Article 121 is outside the authority of many 
organs, and any amendment to this Article is only lawful when it is 
adopted by the Loya Jirga. 
For these reasons, the Supreme Court passed its opinion (Qarar) 
rejecting the authority of the Commission to interpret the Constitution, 
explaining that constitutional interpretation is the exclusive authority of 
the Supreme Court by virtue of Article 121 of the Constitution. 
Accordingly, the Court holds that Article 8(1) of the Commission’s law 
is in contradiction with the Constitution.1 (Translation ended). 
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VIII. APPENDIX II: TRANSLATION OF THE SUPREME COURT’S OPINION 
OF THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF THE LAW OF THE DIPLOMATIC AND 
CONSULAR STAFF OF AFGHANISTAN 
In a letter to the Supreme Court, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs stated 
that Article 5(1) and Article 8 of the law of Diplomatic and Consular 
Staff (requiring that ambassadors and consular staff should have only 
Afghan nationality) are unconstitutional.2 The Ministry argued that in the 
case of the application of the law, 25 ambassadors and 50 other 
personnel around the world, and in the second round, 50 highly 
experienced and educated central personnel, would lose their jobs. The 
Ministry argued that the application of this law violates the fundamental 
rights of the personnel of the Ministry. Therefore, the Ministry referred 
this issue to the Supreme Court and asked its opinion about the 
compliance of Article 5(1) and Article 8 of the Law with the 
Constitution. 
The Supreme Court considered the constitutionality of Article 5(1) 
and Article 8 of the law of the Diplomatic and Consular Staff and 
decided the following: 
The Constitution of Islamic Republic of Afghanistan articulates basic 
principles and general rules. Understanding and realizing the intent of the 
framers consists of an important part of these rules and principles 
because words, requirements, and conditions stipulated in the text of the 
law have special meaning. Understanding the meaning of such words 
requires us to refer to the intent of the framers. Any addition or 
subtraction to the requirements and condition that are mentioned in the 
Constitution are invalid and do not have any legal force. 
There are clear provisions in the Constitution about the requirement of 
single nationality and that which governmental officials should have only 
one nationality (the nationality of Afghanistan). We consider these issues 
in turn. 
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First, the Constitution makes the single nationality requirement 
mandatory only for the president and the vice-presidents. Article 62 of 
the Constitution states that the individual who becomes a presidential 
candidate shall have the following qualifications: (1) shall be a citizen of 
Afghanistan, (2) shall be Muslim, born of Afghan parents, and (3) shall 
not have other nationalities. The provisions of this Article apply to the 
vice-presidents too. As is clear, this Article makes it mandatory for the 
president and the vice-presidents to have only one nationality and a 
person who has a second nationality or is born of non-Afghan parents 
cannot be nominated as president. Therefore, the requirement of singly 
nationality is only obligatory on the president and the vice-presidents and 
cannot be applied to other officials of the state. 
Second, the optionality of second nationality for the ministers, and the 
empowerment of the Wolesi Jirga (lower house of parliament) to either 
reject or accept a candidate with dual nationality indicate that dual 
nationality is not mandatory on the ministers. In this regard, Article 72 
states that the individual who is appointed as a minister shall have the 
following qualifications: shall have only the nationality of Afghanistan; 
if the ministerial candidate has the nationality of another country as well, 
the Wolesi Jirga shall have the right to approve or reject the nomination. 
In this Article, the legislature has not required that ministerial candidate 
must have single nationality, but it has empowered the Wolesi Jirga to 
either accept or reject nominations with dual nationality. This means that 
the president can appoint a person with dual nationality as minister, but it 
is subject to the consent of the Wolesi Jirga. 
Except in these two special circumstances, there is no indication in the 
Constitution that requires state officials, including diplomatic and 
consular staff, to have only one nationality. If we look at the 
Constitution, it becomes apparent that there are no requirements for high-
ranking state officials, who have higher governmental positions than 
ambassadors and diplomats, to have only one nationality. Therefore, it 
means that all these high-ranking state officials, except the president, 
vice-presidents, and cabinet ministers, can carry on their duties even if 
they have two or three nationalities. 
We conclude from this analysis that adding the requirement of single 
nationality in Article 5(1) and Article 8 of the law of the Diplomatic and 
Consular Staff is in clear contradiction with the provisions of the 
Constitution. Therefore, in accordance with Article 121 of the 
Constitution, the High Council of Supreme Court decides on the 
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invalidity of Article 5(1) and Article 8 of the law of Diplomatic and 
Consular Staff. The Supreme Court accordingly informs the authorities 
of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. 
